Történelem | Tanulmányok, esszék » John B. Woodward - Titanic Defended

Source: http://www.doksinet Marine Technology, Vol. 34, No 2, April 1997, pp 119-124 Titanic Defended J o h n B. W o o d w a r d t Authors of popular books on the Titanic tragedy often criticize the design of the ship, e.g, writing that it was deficient in that it lacked watertight decks and longitudinal subdivision. On the other hand, experts in ship design spoke quite differently in the public evaluations of the ship that followed, particularly in the Board of Trade investigation of 1912, and in the SOLAS conferences of 1914 and 1929. Pertinent evcerpts from their findings and rule-makings are quoted, and discussed with respect to their posthumous application to the Titanic. With one exception, this process supports the present authors assertion that the Titanic was neither an unsqfe nor poorly designed ship. INTRODUCTION Newsworthy events bring forth the urge to author, and many are they who answer the call (count the number of books under "O J Simpson" in your favorite

library or bookstore). The Titanic sinking was one such event, and if we except great wars, it may be the event that holds the record for generating the highest-ever stack of hard-cover books. The books are numerous, to be sure, and though some are forgettable and forgotten, the critics say (and I agree) that many do an excellent job of presenting the tragic yet fascinating story. However, even the best of them reveal a telling fault: they are written by writers. Written by writers? Of course, of course, but this seeming tautology emphasizes a significant point: the books are not written by naval architects and engineers. An author-testing litmus that so often smokes out the consequent lack of technical competence is the handling of register tonnage. Write that the ship weighed 46,300 gross tons, or that it was the biggest-ever ship because it weighed 1000 gross tons more than its sister Olympic, and uh-oh, another writer from whom every technical comment is suspect. One might say that

confusing register tonnage with displacement shouldnt cause much pain, scarcely enough to ruin a well-told tale, but unfortunately a writer often gropes through the dimly perceived esoterica of our trade to pass scornful judgments on the designers of the ship in question. Why, the fools put the margin line only three inches below the tops of those "watertight" bulkheads! One little ripple on the surface of the sea, and . No wonder their ship sank, eh? Even the best of authors can add to the pain. As an example, note the words of Walter Lord [1] 2on page 114 in what is overall a splendid book: The Titanic woke them up. Never again would they be quite so sure of themselves. In technology especially, the disaster was a terrible blow Here was the "unsinkable s h i p " perhaps mans greatest engineering achievement--going down the first time it sailed. But it went beyond that If this supreme achievement was so terribly fragile, what about everything else? . It it

was a lesson, it worked--people have never been sure of anything else. So terribly fragile? Because smashing into an iceberg at 20-plus knots ruptured its shell plating? Because flooding of six compartments caused it to sink? And a supreme achievement? Not that ei- ther. My thesis is that the Titanic was a well-designed ship, and, indeed, a conservatively designed ship, that met with an accident (Give us an asteroid in the wrong orbit, and even your planet will seem terribly fragile.) Unlike Lusitania, Empress of Ireland, Morro Castle, Vestris, Andrea Doria, Estonia, Eastland, its demise revealed not deficiencies but strengths. Strengths, not deficiencies? When the Titanic went, it went slowly and without significant list, it launched every boat without difficulty, and its lights shone brightly until the final moments. Beyond those obvious things--which the Titanic is rarely given credit for--we must look to the judgments of the professionals who began their sober evaluations in 1912

[2], and who continued through the two SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea) conferences (1914 and 1929) [3,4,5] that can be attributed to the Titanic case. The message of this paper begins with a list of alleged design deficiencies, a list condensed from writings of the many non-professional authors. After that it outlines the immediate (within three months of the sinking) Board of Trade findings, then examines the regulations developed by the two SOLAS conferences. The appropriate beginning list is • shell plating too thin. • none of decks watertight. • watertight bulkheads not extended high enough. • no longitudinal watertight bulkheads. • poor turning ability. • insufficient lifeboats. Some of these can be judged "true, but inappropriate criticism," others "maybe, but criticism not sustained by professional review," and one "true, and quite damning." That last one, " . damning," is, of course, the lifeboat thing However, it is

immediately stricken from the list because it does not concern design of the ship. Witness that all Titanic lifeboats were launched with ease (certainly not the case in any of the other ships named earlier). Witness that following the Titanic sinking, its sister Olympic was brought up to the newly-recognized standard of boatsfor-all simply by placing more boats within reach of its davits. We shall not attempt to rebut the remaining five canards, but rather let speak the professionals who subsequently struggled, post-Titanic, with the question of safety of life at sea. We quote the appropriate words from Board of Trade and SOLAS, with comments thereon as seem necessary. THE BOARD OF TRADE INVESTIGATION [2] Professor, Departmentof NavalArchitectureand MarineEngineering,The Universityof Michigan.Ann Arbor, MI : Numbersin brackets designateReferencesat the end of the paper. Manuscriptreceived at SNAMEheadquarters July 1996. APRIL 1997 In May-July 1912, an investigation was conducted in

London by Lord Mersey, wreck commissioner, assisted by five assessors. Their work was structured by 26 questions put to them by the British Board of Trade. Most of these questions concerned the events be- 0025-3316/97/3402-0119500.37/0 MARINE TECHNOLOGY 119 Source: http://www.doksinet fore and during the sinking, and so are beyond the scope of this paper. Questions relating specifically to design, and therefore of concern here are these (quotation indicated by a contrasting type face): 2. Before leaving Queenstown did the Titanic comply with the requirements of the Merchant Shipping Acts, 1894-1906, and the rules and regulations made thereunder with regard to the safety and otherwise of passenger steamers and emigrant ships? 3. In the actual design and construction of the Titanic what special provisions were made for the safety of the vessel and the lives of those on board in the event of collisions and other casualties? 5. What was the number of the boats of any kind on board

the Titanic? 19. Was the apparatus for lowering boats on the Titanicat the time of the casualty in good working order? Did the boats, whether those under davits or otherwise, prove to be efficient and serviceable for the purpose of saving life? 25. When the Titanic left Q u e e n s t o w n was she properly constructed and adequately equipped as a passenger steamer and emigrant ship for the Atlantic service? Some of these can be immediately disposed of here. The answers given to #2, #19, and #25 were the simple "yes." The answer to #5 was a detailed listing and description of the boats, which led to the obvious conclusion that they were insufficient in number (though this seemingly contradicts the affirmative answer to #25). Question 3 could not be answered by a single word or short statement. In the Mersey report, almost three pages of discussion constitute the answer. The words that are pertinent to this paper are selectively quoted following: Under Observations I am

advised that the Titanicas constructed could not have remained afloat long with such damage as she received. Her bulkheads were spaced to enable her to remain afloat with any two compartments in communication with the sea. She had a sufficient margin of safety with any two of the compartments flooded which were actually damaged. In fact any three of the four forward compartments could have been flooded by the damage received without sinking the ship to the top of her bulkheads. Even if the four forward compartments had been flooded the water would not have got into any of the compartments abaft of them though it would have been above the top of some of the forward bulkheads. But the ship, even with these four compartments flooded would have remained afloat. The ship as actually constructed was doomed as soon as the water in No. 6 boiler room and all compartments forward of it entered in the quantities it actually did If No 4 had not been damaged., and if the bulkheads had been carried

to C deck, the ship might have been saved. Under Effect of suggested additional subdivision upon flotation With all the compartments certainly known to have been flooded, viz., those forward of No 4 boiler room, the ship would have remained afloat if the bulkhead deck had been a watertight deck. If, however, No 4 boiler room had also been flooded the ship would not have remained afloat unless, in addition to making the bulkhead deck watertight, the transverse bulkhead abaft of No. 4 boiler room had been carried up to D deck. If the Titanic had been divided in the longitudinal method, instead of in the transverse method only, she would have been able, if damaged as supposed, to remain afloat, though with a list which could have been corrected by putting water ballast into suitable places. 120 APRIL 1997 There would be increased protection in carrying the double bottom higher up the side than was done in the Titanic, in that some of the boiler rooms probably would not have then been

flooded, as water could not have entered the ship except in the double bottom. With reference to the question of the watertight doors of the ship, there does not appear to have been any appreciable effect upon the sinking of the ship caused by either shutting or not shutting the doors. There does not appear to have been any difficulty in working the watertight doors. In those ways and words was the matter of subdivision and its possible inadequacy taken into evidence. They led to the recommendations that follow 1. That the newly appointed Bulkhead Committee should enquire and report, among other matters, on the desirability and practicability of providing ships with (a) a double skin carried up above the waterline: or, as an alternative,, with (b) a longitudinal, vertical, watertight bulkhead on each side of the ship, extending as far forward and aft as convenient: or (c) with a combination of (a) and (b). Any one of the three (a), (b) and (c) to be in addition to watertight transverse

bulkheads. 2. That the Committee should also enquire and report as to the desirability and practicability of fitting ships with (a) a deck or decks at a convenient distance or distances above the waterline which shall be watertight throughout a part or the whole of the ships length: and should in this connection report upon (b) the means by which the necessary openings in such decks should be made watertight, whether by watertight doors or watertight trunks or by any other and what means. 3. That the Committee should consider and report generally on the practicability of increasing the protection given by sub-division; the object being to secure that the ship shall remain afloat with the greatest practicable proportion of her length in free communication with the sea. The matter of inadequate lifeboat outfit was treated, certainly, but there was no criticism or recommendation concering the ability of the ship to carry an adequate type and number of boats, or to handle them effectively.

Otherwise, we see the watertight integrity and its possible deficiencies discussed, but the recommendations do not criticize the ship for those deficiencies, but only recommend that the Board of Trade give its attention to this matter. There is no mention of inadequate shell thickness, nor of inadequate turning ability. T H E SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA (SOLAS) C O N F E R E N C E OF 1914 [3,4] Lord Merseys recommendations were directed at the British Board of Trade, the body that instigated his investigation, and the only body at the time that could act upon them. Meanwhile, the not i o n - c e r t a i n l y an obvious o n e - - o f international standards prevailed, and our first SOLAS convened in London in November 1913. The president of the conference was the same Lord Mersey The delegates represented the United States and all of the maritime nations of Europe. Japan did not participate, but sent official observers The 19 months that had elapsed since the sinking that instigated this

first SOLAS conference presumably gave the professionals ample time to hone their ideas on passenger ship safety, and the approximately two months of deliberation was presumably enough for rational discussion and consensus. During the yea>and-a-half hiatus between the Mersey report and the opening of the SOLAS deliberations, the ghost of the Titanic may have seemed to have remained under indictment for its lack of watertight decks and longitudinal bulkheads. In addition, the failure of the Mersey report MARINE TECHNOLOGY Source: http://www.doksinet to mention shell plating and steering qualities could not be regarded as an unequivocal dropping-of-charges, for critics still groused that the investigation was biased in favor of things British in an attempt to put down the earlier American investigation. Indictment is not conviction, but impatient authors nonetheless rushed to print to tell the world how an unsinkable ship should really should be designed. One especially vociferous

author [6] spoke with high confidence about the value of longitudinal bulkheads. Why, just look at the Lusitania, he wrote, with longitudinal bulkheads that divide its hull into 34 compartments, compared to the mere 16 of the Titanic. He dared not use the word "unsinkable," it having fallen into eternal disrepute, but he certainly implied that his paragon deserved that label. (In a way maybe it did: one could make the speculative case that the Lusitania would have survived the Titanics iceberg, while the Titanic would have survived the Lusitanias torpedo.) Our attention is, of course, on the outcome of the SOLAS conference. It did many obvious things, such as recommending an international ice patrol in the North Atlantic, the no-exceptions principle that lifeboats or liferafts be provided with capacity for everyone on board, and that a 24-hour watch be maintained in the wireless room. But this conference was completely silent on two points of possible contention: thickness of

shell plating, and turning ability. With respect to the first, one might infer that the conferees recognized classification societies as ensurers of adequate hull strength, while concluding that armoring a hull so that nothing could penetrate it was totally impracticable (Joseph Conrad [7] appears to be the principal author of the thin-plate conceit, and perhaps it was his literary stature that gave it currency, but as a shipbuilding authority Id rate Lech Walesa ahead of him any day.) With respect to the second, Id not take the omission to be blessing of the Titanic, but rather as stemming from a desire to avoid offering any encouragement to high speed operation in conditions of poor visibility, or in the presence of ice. With respect to both, one might speculate that the dismissals were a consequence of insufficient awareness. Only with the investigations of the 90s have we become aware of the possible significance to the Titanic of the material properties of its hull steel, while

meaningful analysis of ship steering had to await many years of hull model testing, as well as major inputs from the yet-to-be science of aeronautics. These aspects of the Titanic are thus still open to investigation in our time, but nothing was known or knowable in the 1912 era (or in 1929, for that matter) to justify criticism. Lets examine the SOLAS 1914 items that do relate directly to the Titanic design. Under Regulations, Construction, we find Articles V, VI, VII: Definitions relating to floodable length, and numerical values. For steam vessels, the machinery space, including double bottom: 80% Cargo spaces, bunkers, storerooms, baggage and mail rooms, chain lockers, watertight shaft for pipe tunnels, fresh-water tanks above the double bottom: 60% Passenger and crew spaces, peaks, trimming tanks, double bottoms, and all other spaces not listed above: 95% Articles VIII and IX, Permissable Length of Compartments. All parts of these articles that appear pertinent to our discussion

are quoted following. 1. The maximum permissible length of one compartment having its center at any point in the vessels length is obtained from the floodable length by multiplying that length by an appropriate factor, called the factor of subdivision. 2. This factor of subdivision depends on the length of the vessel, and, for a given length, varies according to the nature of the service for which the vessel is intended. This factor decreases in a regular and continuous manner-a. As the length of the vessel increases; and b. As, for a given length, the vessel departs from the type of vessel engaged in a mixed cargo and pasAPRIL 1997 senger service, and approaches the type of vessel primarily engaged in the transportation of passengers. (3) For each of the two types of vessels referred to in the previous paragraph (2)(b) the variation of the factor of subdivision may be expressed by a curve, of which the coordinates represent the length of the vessel and the value of the factor.The

following table gives certain points on two curves the higher of which corresponds to the minimum requirements for the "mixed" type, and the lower the minimum requirements for the "passenger" type. A B C 1.00 295 259 0.90 374 285 0.84 404 305 0.65 489 380 0.50 571 489 0.39 699 685 0.34 899 899 (The original table gives lengths in meters also.) Column A gives the maximum permissible values of the factor of subdivision for the length of vessels given in columns B and C. Column B is applicable to vessels engaged in mixed cargo and passenger service Column C is applicable to vessels primarily engaged in the transportation of passengers. 4. For a given length, the value of the factor of subdivision appropriate to a vessel between two extreme limits will be between the values of the factors determined by the two curves before mentioned, and will be automatically fixed by a "criterion of service" which is to form the subject of further study. Article X continues

the above. 1. When the factor of subdivision is equal to or less than 05, it may be doubled in order to give at any point of the vessels length the total length of two adjacent compartments; but, in that case, the length of the shorter compartment of any pair shall not be less than one-quarter of the total length so obtained. If one of the two adjacent compartments is situated inside the machinery space and the second is situated outside the machinery space, and the average permeability of the portion of the ship in which the second is situated differs from 80 percent, the length of the pair of compartments shall be adjusted to the proper value by applying a suitable correction. 2. In no case whatever shall the length of any watertight compartment exceed 28 meters (92 feet). 3. When the factor of subdivision applicable to any vessel is less than 0.84, but more than 05, the combined length of the two foremost compartments shall not exceed the floodable length at the extreme forward end,

provided also that the length of the second compartment is not greater than that permissible by Article VIII above, and not less than 3 meters (10 feet). 4. When the length of the vessel is more than 213 meters (699 feet) but less than 251 meters (823 feet) the floodable length at the forward end of the vessel shall be at least 20 percent of the vessels length; and the vessel forward of a bulkhead placed either at the distance of the actual floodable length abaft the stem or not nearer to the stem than 20 percent of the vessels length, shall be divided into at least three compartments. 5. When the length of the vessel is equal to or greater than 251 meters (823 feet) the same method shall be adopted, but the floodable length shall be at least 28 percent and the number of compartments at least four. MARINE TECHNOLOGY 121 Source: http://www.doksinet Article XXI Double bottoms Double bottoms specified for vessels above certain lengths. In vessels over 213 meters in length, the double

bottom, for at least half the vessels length amidships and forward to the forepeak bulkhead, shall extend up the vessels sides to a height above the top of the keel not less than 10 percent of the vessels molded breadth. < d Article XXII Going astern II -4 Vessels shall have sufficient power for going astern to se- cure proper control of the vessel in all circumstances. L O O K I N G BACK FROM SOLAS 1914 TO THE TI T A N I C L) ¢5 il [aa O9 I / I / 3 e~ > 6~ e- II o °~ ,:5 Any three of the four forward compartments could have been flooded without sinking the ship to the top of her bulkheads. Even if the four forward compartments had been flooded., the ship would have remained afloat The ship as actually constructed was doomed as soon as the water in No. 6 boiler room and all compartments forward of it entered in the quantities that it actually did lJJ It -1 7" <-, "--J i 122 APRIL 1997 Concerning Article XXI. The Titanic double bottom did

not extend up, its sides (10% of molded breadth would be 93 feet) Here, then, is an apparent direct condemnation of a design feature of that ship, perhaps inspired by the circumstance that flooding of its boiler rooms, at least, is said to have come from the turn of the bilge. Concerning Article XXII. Here is the only mention of a maneuvering-related topic Surely this demand for "~proper control of the vessel in all circumstances" did not imply the ability to stop short of a suddenly-looming iceberg. In any case, the two reciprocating engines of the Titanic gave it more backing power than was then or later customary with steam turbine propulsion. Concerning Articles V through X. Here we need a floodable length curve. Along with many other items of interest, such a thing does not exist in the public domain. However, curves made in 1996, apparently from genuine source material, have been published [10]. The curve shown here (Fig. 1) was also made in 1996 as part of the

preparation for this paper, but was made from offsets estimated from deck plans published in 1911 [ 11 ]. Accuracy is suspect in such a make-do method, of course, but the curves from reference 10 offer a means of checking. After some adjusting to avoid conflict with those curves, the curve here may be rated a "good approximation." (However, the curves unusual width is a reminder that it doesnt originate in accurate source material.) The question of permeability is obviously important in floodable length, and among the unknowables are the permeabilities that the Titanic designers used. Values specified by SOLAS 1914 are reproduced above, but they appear to leave too much latitude for interpretation when one is confronted with compartments of mixed use. The values used in Fig 1 are therefore obtained via an adventure in time travel--they are based on formulas offered 15 years later by SOLAS 1929 (to be stated later). The curve confirms the statements made in the Mersey report

(and quoted earlier), namely e~ But with respect to watertight subdivision, would the ship have conformed to the regulations of SOLAS 1914? In the absence of a "criterion of service" we must use 0.34 (from a table reproduced above) for the factor of subdivision, then doubled to 0.68 for the total length that two adjacent compartments may have. The compartments between bulkheads C and E have a total length of 105 feet: then 105/0.68 = 154, which just about obeys the rule. If the 1914 value of machinery space permeability is used, or if an appropriate average of the 0.85 and 072 values is used in this neighborhood, then the rule is easily met. The LBp is 850 feet, of which 28% is 238; floodable length is 234 feet at the forward end. The length of the first four compartments is 193 feet, which meets the requirement of four compartments within the forward floodable length. MARINE TECHNOLOGY Source: http://www.doksinet The partial curve at the forward end of the ship, Fig. 1,

demonstrates the benefit of raising bulkheads to the D Deck level, a retrofit applied to the Olympic before the 1914 regulations were published It appears that this step was not required to comply with those regulations, but may well have been worth the reassurances it gave the transatlantic traveler. A cynic may raise the point that our professional forebears simply closed ranks to contrive rules that whitewashed the Titanic stain on their collective reputation. That point could indeed be argued-but not here (Suggestion to a future PhD candidate: test the rules in your thesis, which features a computer simulation in which all 20th-century transatlantic liners immolate themselves among the ice fields.) AN ADDENDUM: SOLAS 1929 [4, 5] SOLAS 1914 was never ratified• After the Great War had changed the world, and greatly increased its knowledge of how ships might sink, a fresh start seemed preferable to effecting the many changes that stood in the way of ratification• SOLAS 1929 was

the upshot of this feeling. In this instance we shall not quote extensively, but will only note things that seem to bear especially on the Titanic case. Watertight decks, inner skins, and longitudinal bulkheads still gained no approval. These, so strongly advocated by some critics in 1912, were given these words: "where it is proposed to fit watertight decks, inner skins or longitudinal bulkheads, watertight or non-watertight, the Administration shall be satisfied that the safety of the ship will not be diminished in any respect, particularly having in view the possible listing effect of flooding in the way of such structural arrangements." The feature of greatest significance to our discussions was publication of the criterion of service formula which was to be "the subject of further study" in 1914. The following formula was offered in 1929: M+2P I V+PI-P (the version for which P~ > P) C~ = 72 where M = the volume of machinery space + volume of permanent fuel

oil bunkers above the innerbottom V = volume of ship below the margin line P = volume of passenger spaces below margin line P~ = 0.6 x length x number of passengers Estimated inputs for the Titanic give C = 77. The factor of subdivision is based on two curves, reproduced here as Fig. 2 The factors of subdivision given by the table reproduced from the 1914 regulations also appear in the form of curves in the same figure. It can be observed that the 1929 factors differ slightly from the 1914 values; e.g, the 034 that was used above in discussing floodable length would be 0.32 in 1929 However, a big difference is introduced by the criterion of service, used to interpolate between the upper and lower curves by the formula F = A - (A - B) (Q - 23) 100 where A and B are the values read from the A and B curves. This formula gives the value 0.39 for Titanic Looking back at the earlier discussion of Titanic compliance with the 1914 Convention, we see that this later value of factor of

subdivision is favorable; i.e, it places the ship in a better position with respect to the regulations SOLAS 1929 also reduces the ambiguity of in the 1914 specifications of permeabilities. The following two formulas are given, the first for machinery spaces only: g = 80+12.5 a--c a = 63 + 35 7-7 where v is volume of ship over length of interest, a is the volume of passenger and crew spaces over that length, and c is the volume of cargo spaces over that length. The formulas just cited produced the estimated values of permeabilities used in Fig. 1 1.0 "\ %, "~ N 0.6 o ¢.) N ~ ,,,, 1914 CURVEB ~ 1929 ~ ~,,~ CURVEA 1929 CURVEB 1914 "~ ~-.,, ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~,. 0.4 0.2 200 400 60O 1000 800 Subdivision length of ship, feet Fig. 2 Factor of subdivision curves from the 1914 and 1929 SOLAS rule-making [3,4,5] APRIL 1997 MARINE TECHNOLOGY 123 Source: http://www.doksinet COMPARISONS Centerline It may be of interest to compare parameters relating

to watertight integrity with later transatlantic liners. In the following table, all ships except the Titanic and E u r o p a (from the 1920s) were built in accord with the 1929 Convention. All values cited, except those for the Titanic, are from a 1946 S N A M E paper [12]. Titanic (estimated) Europa Manhattan C o n t e di S a v o i a Rex America Normandie g fwd 72 74 73 75 74 72 76 g machy 85 82 84 77 84 82 82 C, F 77 90.7 71.3 89.7 88.6 66.7 93.1 0.39 0.35 0.47 0.39 0.38 0.48 0.34 g o P~ The scope of this paper does not allow the lengthy discussion that might be based on these figures. We shall only note that nothing indicates that the Titanic does not belong in the family of successful transatlantic liners. = ,,, , REMARKS ON THE EXTENDED DOUBLE BOTTOM The 1914 S O L A S specified double bottoms carried up a vessels sides to a height of at least 10 percent of beam. The Titanic double bottom ended at the turn of the bilge, as shown in Fig. 3 (The figure suggests a

question: why just 10 percent?) If it had extended the requisite 9.3 feet from the baseline, its presence might have prevented flooding of the boiler rooms, and thereby saved the ship This point can therefore be taken as an implied criticism by professionals of the Titanic design. Since their j u d g m e n t was based on hindsight (ie, experience with collisions between ships and icebergs), one could argue that their verdict was n o t a criticism of the designers who could not share that hindsight. We shall not argue that point here. CONCLUSIONS While writers told their stories with (often) their imbedded criticisms of the profession of ship design and building, the expert representatives of that profession gathered to render the lessons of the Titanic into the canon of safety at sea. Three times they did this, and on the last occasion (1929), at least, public outcry that might influence their deliberations had been swamped by larger and more terrible events. Some of the criticisms

listed in the Introduction were put down simply by silence. On examining their works in the area of watertight i n t e g r i t y - - w h i c h , after all, is the key to sinking or not s i n k i n g - - w e can find only one clear c o n d e m n a t i o n of the Titanic: its double bottom should have extended up the sides for a distance of about nine feet. W h e t h e r this was a major or m i n o r fault is a point not argued here. W h e t h e r or no, the point that the Titanic was well designed with regard to safety is demonstrated. REFERENCES 1. Lord, W, 1955, A Night to Remember Henry Holt and Company, New York. 2. Lord Mersey 1912, "Report of The Loss of The Steamship Titanic" Great 124 APRIL 1997 2-, l - Web frames7 ,~ , . .,; . " 10 percent of molded beam I Fig. 3 Sketch of Titanic" innerbottom and side structure, based on published plans [ 11 ] Britain, court to investigate the loss of the steamship Titanic, Her Majestys Stationery

Office, London. 3. Chamberlain, E T, 1914, "International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea, 1914, with Special Reference to Ship Construction," Transactions, Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, Vol. 22, pp 1-8 4. Rock, G H, 1929, "The International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea, 1929, with Special Reference to Ship Construction," Transactions, Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, Vol. 37, pp 89-100 5. Tawresey, J G, 1929, "The International Conference of 1929 and The Convention for Safety of Life at Sea," Transactions, Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, "9ol. 37, pp 101-127 6. Walker, J B, 1912, An Unsinkable Titanic, Dodd Mead and Company, New York. 7. Heyer, R, 1995, Titanic Legacy: Disaster as a Media Event, Praeger Publishing, Westport, Connecticut 8. Garzke, W H, Jr, Brown, D K, and Sandiford, A, "The Stuctural Failure of the Titanic;" Proceedings, Oceans "94 Conference, pp.

111-138 9. Garzke, W H, Jr, Brown, D K, Sandiford, A D, Woodward, J B, and Hsu, R K., 1996, "The Titanic and Lusitania: A Final Forensic Analysis," Marine "Iechnology, Vol. 33, No 4, pp 241-289 10. Hackett, C, and Bedford, J G, 1996, "The Sinking of SS Titanic Investigated by Modern Techniques," Institute of Marine Engineers and The Royal Institution of Naval Architects, Northern Ireland Joint Branch, March 26, 1996. 11. Engineering, I911, Voi 91, May 26 issue 12. Bw:es, J L, and Wanless, I J, 1946, "Aspects of Large Passenger Liner Design," Transactions, Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, Vol. 54, pp. 317-373 MARINE TECHNOLOGY